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Abstract 
This paper proposes the architecture for a Self Managed Cell (SMC) for managing both 
individual and teams of Unmanned Autonomous Vehicles (UXVs).  We outline how to specify 
a mission in terms of roles for UXVs, the tasks to be performed by a role and the policies for 
managing tasks.  A mission specification also includes role assignment policies for validating 
credentials and capabilities of a UXV joining the SMC and authorisation policies defining 
what interactions are permitted between roles or what services a role can access.  The 
concepts are illustrated using a reconnaissance scenario.       
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Introduction  
Unmanned Autonomous Vehicles (UXVs) 
need to adapt their behaviour to current 
context – location, activity, available 
resources such as battery power and 
available services such as quality of 
communications link. They should be self-
managing in that they have to recover or 
adapt to component failures and optimise 
performance to best utilise available 
resources. Additionally, a team of UXVs 
should cooperate to achieve a particular 
mission such as surveillance of a specific 
area or search for specific targets.   
We propose using the concept of a Self 
Managed Cell (SMC) [1] as the general 
architectural principle for realizing self 
management of both individual UXVs and 
teams of UXVs.  The SMC is an approach 
to autonomic computing [2] that 
emphasises the use of policy to support 
adaptive self-management. In our 
approach, collaborating UXVs form a 
SMC, where the SMC is responsible for 
self-configuration, as UXVs may join or 
leave the SMC; self-optimisation in order 
to achieve the mission with minimum 
delay or to minimise use of resources; self-
healing to recover from failures and self-
protecting in that hostile entities may try to 
subvert the mission by masquerading as 
members of the cell or mounting denial of 
service attacks to try to deplete resources 
or prevent communications.   
A UXV may be composed of various 
sensors for vision, sound, vibration, 
chemical detection, location as well as 
supporting communication links. Usually, 
not all capabilities are available in a single 
vehicle and so one UXV may provide 
services to others in the team.  Multiple 
sub-teams of UXVs may also collaborate 
to achieve an overall mission and so our 
concept of a SMC permits the 
composition of SMCs to form larger 
more complex SMCs and to allow for 
peer-to-peer relations between SMC.  
Note that in our architecture, the body-
area-network of a soldier, together with 
his communications facilities, may also 
form a SMC and permit him to control 
the overall team of UXVs forming a 
larger SMC.  
A UXV will have a capability 
specification that describes its resources 
and the services it can perform. A 
commander, which could be a human or 
another UXV, issues a mission 
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specification to be undertaken by a set of 
UXVs. Based on the mission specification 
and the capability specification of the 
UXV, it will be assigned to perform 
specific roles within the team which 
cooperates to perform the assigned 
mission 
 In the following section we present the 
SMC common architectural pattern and 
its overall functionality. We then present 
a policy-based mission specification and 
elaborate on the approach using an 
example scenario followed by brief 
discussions of communication and 
security issues associated with UXV 
missions. Finally a brief summary of 
related work is presented.  
The Self Managed Cell Concept and 
Architecture  
An SMC is a closed-loop systematic 
organization of management services 
which represent a set of hardware and 
application components in a single device, 
or multiple devices collaborating to 
achieve a common goal. The 
management services interact with each 
other through an asynchronous event bus. 
As a minimum an SMC should contain a 
measurement and event service, and a 
policy service [1] which are required in 
order to implement a feed-back loop 
adaptation mechanism.  
The basic architecture of an SMC is shown 
in Figure 1. We will briefly describe the 
function of each core service.   
The Policy Service is the means of 
specifying the adaptive behaviour of an 
SMC.  Policies [3] are rules governing 
choices in behaviour and we focus on two 
main types of policies namely obligation 
and authorization.  Obligations are event-
condition-action rules and authorisation 
policies define what actions a subject can 
perform on a target resource or service.  
Policies can be dynamically modified to 
adapt behaviour.   
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Figure 1: Architecture of a SMC  
  The Discovery Service discovers 
components which are in range and 
capable of being members of the SMC. For 
example, there may be some UXVs from 
another mission or belonging to an ally that 
can provide specific services or aid in 
accomplishing the goals of the SMC team.   
There are obviously issues relating to 
authentication when discovering new 
UXVs as enemy UXVs must not be 
allowed to join the SMC.   We also have to 
cater for the fact that UXVs may 
temporarily been out of wireless contact, 
for example when behind an obstruction, 
but then come back into range, so have not 
left the SMC.   
The Event Bus is responsible for 
asynchronous notification of events to 
different management services of the SMC. 
Event notification is a crucial element of an 
SMC because adaptation, protection and 
other self-management actions are 
specified in terms of obligation policies 
triggered by events. An obligation policy 
may perform an action which modifies the 
behaviour of a single UXV or it may 
enable or disable other policies to change 
the overall behaviour of the SMC. The use 
of an event bus also allows maintaining 
loose coupling between the various SMC 
services which can react concurrently and 
independently to event notifications.  
However we do not constrain all 
communication to be over the event bus 
e.g. video sent from a camera would not 
make use of the event bus.  
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The Measurement and Monitoring Service 
is responsible for keeping track of the 
SMC's operation and generates events 
when actions need to be taken. Events 
may indicate degradation or failure of 
components, detection of specific 
landmarks or possible ‘unidentified’ 
entities etc.  
The Context Service uses sensors to 
determine information such as current 
location, weather conditions, what other 
SMCs or other entities are in the vicinity 
as the SMC behaviour will adapt to 
current context. 
Roles provide a means of grouping 
components in the cell according to their 
capabilities and correspond to the role 
they play within the cell.  For example 
UXVs with satellite transceivers will be 
assigned to a long-range-communications 
role; UXVs with short range transceivers 
will be assigned to an ad-hoc-network 
role; UXVs with video cameras would be 
assigned to a vision role, airborne UXVs 
would be assigned to an air-surveillance 
role and officer-SMC would be assigned 
to a cell controller role.  
A SMC is a generic concept which can be 
used to accomplish specific missions.  
The mission specification identifies 
specific required roles, tasks to be 
performed or services to be provided by 
the components assigned to the required 
roles, policies related to the roles etc.  
These concepts will be elaborated in 
terms of a specific scenario outlined 
below. 
Reconnaissance Scenario 
In this section, we illustrate our approach 
using a UXV-mission scenario based on 
the Urban reconnaissance scenario 
specified in [4]. In this scenario there are 
four UXVs and the objective is to collect 
data regarding the layout and contents of a 
house to determine whether it is safe for 
humans to move in to the house or not. It 
is suspected that there may be hazardous 
chemical, biological materials or ex-
plosives in the house. There is also a 
possibility that persons may still be 
present in the house which may attack or 
sabotage the UXVs. 
We assume the UXVs include 
functionality such as overland movement 
and propulsion, autonomous navigation, 
adaptive mission planning, sensing (e.g. 
infrared, explosive material detection, 
radiation or chemical detection), target 
recognition or identification and situation 
assessment. The UXVs have a data link 
among themselves and to a command 
vehicle which has high-speed long-range 
communication and more sophisticated 
processing and data storage capabilities.  
Roles and Mission Specification 
We can identify the following roles in this 
scenario. 
Commander: this is a manned vehicle with 
a range of communications equipment. 
Surveyors: the surveyors divide the 
volume of the house among them and 
produce a map and video of their space. 
They send the collected data to the 
aggregator which relays it to the 
commander.   
Aggregator: produces a map of the 
whole space and distributes it back to 
the surveyors so that they can use it for 
the remaining reconnaissance. It will also 
send all the aggregated information to the 
command centre. 
The roles act as ‘placeholders’ for the 
purpose of specifying the required 
behaviour of the UXVs assigned to roles. 
This behaviour is specified in the form of 
policies which define the tasks which the 
UXV will perform and privileges with 
respect to accessing services provided by 
other roles or shared resources within the 
SMC. 
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Figure 2: Mission SMC 
Figure 2 shows the main roles for the 
scenario forming a Mission SMC. This 
SMC can be formed on the commander 
UXV.  This SMC will issue a mission 
specification which will be interpreted by 
the involved roles. An outline mission 
specification defining the roles and tasks 
is given in Figure 3.   
There is only one command vehicle in this 
mission and as it has the required 
capabilities, it is assigned to the 
commander role so it acts as the mission or 
SMC controller. However the UXVs to be 
assigned to surveyor and aggregator roles 
may be discovered later as they may come 
into radio range only when the commander 
is near the surveillance area.  A discovered 
UXV would first have to be authenticated 
and its credentials (certificates) verified in 
order to ensure that the UXV belongs to an 
allied force. If it has the required video and 
sensors it would be assigned to a surveyor 
role and if it had the required processing 
and storage it would be assigned to an 
aggregator role.    
1. oblig on  discovered ( uxv, credentials, resources)  
do /smc/roles/commander.assign (uxv)  
when authenticate (credentials) and 
 resources.comms  = “longRange” 
 
2.  oblig on  discovered (  uxv, credentials, resources)  
do /smc/roles/surveyor.assign (uxv) 
when authenticate (credentials) and  
  resources.sensor1  = “video” and  
  resources.sensor2  = “chemical”  
3. oblig on  discovered (  uxv, credentials, resources)  
do /smc/roles/aggregator.assign (uxv) 
when authenticate (credentials) and 
  resources. process  > medium 
 
Mission shared knowledge base  
         Certificates and encryption keys needed for security   
functions 
         Preloaded maps 
         Overall mission constraints e.g. max. vehicle 
distance for ad-hoc networking 
         Time Constraints 
Role types 
  Role commander 
       Role assignment policy - what resources or 
certificates are needed  
       Tasks 
   Report to headquarters 
    Policies related to reporting to headquarters 
   Manage aggregators 
    Policies related to managing aggregators 
   Manage surveyors 
    Policies related to managing surveyors 
       Authorisation policies needed for interaction with 
other roles 
 Role aggregators 
        Role assignment policy - what resources or 
certificates are needed  
  Tasks 
   Movement tasks 
    Policies related to movement 
   Collect map data from surveyors 
    Policies related to collecting map data 
   Aggregate maps 
    Policies related to aggregating maps 
   Send map data to commander 
    Policies sending map data to commander 
        Authorisation policies needed for interaction with 
other roles 
 Role Surveyors 
       Role assignment policy - what resources or 
certificates are needed  
    Tasks 
   Movement tasks 
    Policies related to movement 
             Setting survey boundaries in cooperation with other 
surveyors 
    Policies related to setting survey boundaries 
   Capture video 
    Policies related to managing video camera 
   Draw map 
    Policies related to generating maps 
   Detect hazardous chemicals 
                 Policies related to detecting explosives and 
indicating on map 
   Transmit map & video to aggregator 
    Policies for sending map and video to 
aggregator 
      Authorisation policies needed for interaction with 
other roles 
Figure 3: Mission Specification 
The above policies specify how a newly 
discovered UXV can be assigned to the 
appropriate role, after the credentials have 
been successfully verified, based on the 
UXV’s profile including its resources and 
capabilities. Note that encoding the role 
assignment as policies enables us to 
change the strategy of this assignment 
during the mission without interrupting its 
functioning.  
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When assigned to the relevant role, the 
initial tasks and policies relating to that 
role specified in the mission will be loaded 
into the relevant UXV.  During the course 
of the mission, the commander may 
download new tasks and policies into 
UXVs or just enable or disable some that 
have been preloaded.  This is the means 
for adapting the behaviour of the UXVs 
within a role.  For example the commander 
may activate relay-mode communications 
for the surveyors if some seem to be going 
out of range.   
4. oblig on  range_failure do 
/smc/roles/surveyor/*.enable(relaymode) 
Although the approach to planning 
depends on the specific type of robot 
software architecture used in the UXV, 
assuming a hybrid architecture [5, 6] that 
has a higher level deliberative part which 
specifies the sequence of tasks and a lower 
level reactive [7] part which contains 
groups of primitive behaviours such as 
moving to a certain point, we are 
investigating the possibility of using 
policies to specify plans (sequences of 
tasks) and behavioural parameters. 
For instance when a UXV assumes a 
surveyor role, its corresponding plan may 
be expressed in the Finite State Machine 
(FSM) shown in Figure 4. The UXV will 
either perform one of the tasks, i.e., either 
locating hazardous chemicals or 
maintaining communication (by serving as 
a repeater) depending on the task it 
undertakes. Whichever task it takes it 
might switch between the two tasks based 
on events. It is possible to specify this plan 
using policies as follows: 
oblig on  task(LHC) do  /smc/tasks.init(LHC) 
oblig on  task(Repeater) do 
 /smc/tasks.init(Maintain_communication) 
oblig on  communication_failure do  
 /smc/tasks.switchto(Maintain_communication) 
oblig on  no_communication_failure  do  
 /smc/tasks.switchto(LHC) 
Each task can further be specified using an 
Start Enter room
Look for 
barrel
Test barrel
Leave room
Mark on 
map
In_room No_new_barrel
Chemical_detected
No_chemical
Barrel_detected
Figure 5:  Locate-Chemical Task FSM
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FSM; if we consider the task of locating 
hazardous chemicals, the plan to achieve 
this might be expressed in the Finite State 
Machine (FSM) shown in Figure 5. 
Again, we can specify this plan using 
policies using a similar approach as shown 
before. Finally the subtask in each task, 
i.e., the behaviours or assemblage of 
behaviours [7, 8] can be adapted to the 
current environment by using policies to 
specify behavioural parameters. 
For instance, let us consider one of the 
assemblage of behaviours - ‘entering a 
room’, this assemblage can roughly be 
treated as a superposition of a set of 
primitive behaviours such as Moving to a 
goal, Wandering, Avoiding obstacles, and  
Biasing a move [9]. 
Superposing these primitive behaviours to 
produce a vector, which will control the 
motor, involves using behavioural 
parameters. The optimal values for these 
parameters differ in different environments 
and context. Policies can be used to adapt 
primitive behaviours by changing the 
behavioural parameters based on context. 
Authorisation policies specify how the 
roles are permitted to interact e.g.: 
5. auth+   /smc/roles/surveyor  -> 
 /smc/role/aggregator.sendmap() 
6.  auth+   /smc/roles/commander  -> 
 /smc/role/surveyor.enable() 
Policy 5 permits any UXV in the surveyor 
role to invoke sendmap on a UXV in 
aggregator role and policy 6 permits the 
commander to enable operation modes on 
surveyors.  
Communication 
We are investigating the network 
management issues related to autonomous 
vehicle teams. Autonomous vehicles need 
to have continuous and quality (based on 
the mission type) communication through 
out a mission. Hence network management 
is an important part of an autonomous 
vehicle system.  
The network management framework 
should address at least three main issues: 
• Network setup among vehicles 
performing a mission (likely an ad hoc net 
work with a connection to a backbone). 
This network will most likely be wireless 
LAN.  
•  Network maintenance: this issue is 
special in autonomous vehicles because 
the network nodes move and we want the 
movement of nodes to be in such a way 
that the nodes are always within a wireless 
link range. This needs a distributed 
algorithm to control movement 
(formation) based on the wireless link 
signal strength among vehicles (nodes). 
Because digital signals suffer severe 
attenuation, the data rate of a wireless link 
decreases considerably with distance.  
• Network performance monitoring. 
Security Consideration 
We are investigating the security issues 
related to authentication, authorisation and 
how to isolate faulty or malicious UXVs 
which might subvert the mission.   
We assume that UXVs are capable of 
performing asymmetric key based 
cryptography.  We will investigate the use 
of signed credential certificates for 
authenticating identity, public keys and 
organisation membership of UXVs.  This 
requires the ability to preload a set of 
public keys and some secret keys onto a 
UXV. These can be used to securely 
distribute keys for communication 
encryption and SMC membership keys.  It 
is likely that we will need both SMC keys 
for encrypting communication between all 
members of a SMC as well as role specific 
keys.  For example, a SMC belonging to 
an ally may not be fully trusted so should 
only be able to decrypt the interactions 
related to the role it performs.  Key 
management protocols are needed for 
changing keys when UXVs leave the cell.   
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Assigning UXVs to roles allows 
authorisation to be specified in terms of 
roles – a form of Role based access 
control.   However we may need some 
sub-roles for UXVs belonging to allies or 
other organisations and hence are not fully 
trusted.  They would then only have access 
to a subset of the resources and services 
provided by the SMC. 
We also have to consider that a UXV may 
be captured or, as a result of a fault, start 
behaving anomalously.   It is necessary to 
be able to detect anomalous behaviour, 
take action to isolate the anomalous UXV 
from the SMC and possibly distribute new 
keys to other SMC members.   
Related Work 
Kephert et al. [2] define an Autonomic 
Element as a component that is responsible 
for managing its behaviour and interaction 
in accordance with policies. The SMC 
concept is thus an autonomic element 
which realizes policy-based self-
management. Although most of the current 
work on Autonomic Computing focuses 
on large scale web servers and cluster 
computing, they also identify policy as the 
key to adaptive behaviour.  
Keoh et al. [11] have proposed an 
approach to establish and manage mobile 
ad-hoc-networks using policies. They 
introduced a community specification 
called doctrine which defines the roles of 
the participants in the community, the 
characteristics that participants must 
exhibit in order to be eligible to play a 
role, as well as the policies governing their 
behaviour within the community. The 
mission specification we are intending to 
use is in some ways similar to doctrine. 
But because our specification also involves 
tasks, it will noticeably differ from 
doctrine. 
Likhachev et al. [9] have proposed an 
approach to automatic modification of 
behavioural assemblage parameters for 
autonomous navigation tasks. Their 
approach is based on Artificial Intelligence 
in that it uses case based reasoning. We try 
to solve the same problem using a different 
approach, i.e., policy.   
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